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The Ultimate, the Supreme Truth, could not be reached through it. Becoming keenly aware of the theological limitations of reason, he fell into a state of scepticism and lost his peace of mind. The hypocrisy of his orthodox teaching became unbearable and he found himself to be in a false position. But all was not lost: It was not that he now discovered that in Sufism lay the possibility for a direct encounter with reality; this fact he had been realizing over a period of years.
He had made a theoretical study of Sufism and had even ventured into Sufistic exercises; only he had not advanced far enough into them. If he could consecrate himself to the Sufistic way of life through spiritual renunciation, sustained asceticism, and prolonged and deep meditation, he might have received the light he sought.
But this meant in his case giving up his brilliant academic career and worldly position. He was by nature ambitious and had great desire for fame and self-glorification. On the other hand, he was the most earnest seeker after truth.
Besides, he had the anxiety to reach a secure faith which was accentuated by his thought of life after death. He collapsed physically and mentally; appetite and digestion failed and he lost his power of speech. After having paid his visit to the tomb of Abraham at Hebron, he went on pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina; then followed a long period of retreat at different places in holy shrines and mosques and wandering in deserts. He keenly felt it incumbent upon him to crush heresy and unbelief around him and to call people back to the truth and moral power of Islam, both through writing and teaching: He began to devote himself more and more to the study of the traditions of the Prophet and make an extensive use of them for the purposes of edification and spiritual guidance.
But he did not stay there long and retired once more to his home in Tns and established a madrasah at which he began to teach both theology and Tasawwuf.
There he lived in peace with some personal disciples having charge of his madrasah. It was a beautifully complete and round life in which the end came to the beginning. The best expression of it is given in his famous autobiographical work, al-Munqidh min al-Dalal The, Deliverer from Error , which he wrote some five years before his death.
For himself he said that he had embarked on the open sea of knowledge right from his adolescence setting aside all craven caution: I scrutinized the creed of every sect and I fathomed the mysteries of each doctrine. All this I did that I might distinguish between the true and the false.
There was not a philosopher whose system I did not acquaint myself with, nor a theologian whose doctrines I did not examine. If ever I met a Sufi, I coveted to probe into his secrets; if an ascetic, I investigated into the basis of his austerities; if one of the atheistic zindiqs, I groped into the causes of his bold atheism.
He was free from the parochialism of the dogmatic theologians of his day who would rather consign the books of the atheists and philosophers to flames than read them. But prepared though he was to listen to every creed and doctrine, he would accept none and doubt all. For one thing, he came to the conclusion that the greatest hindrance in the search for truth was the acceptance of beliefs on the authority of others and blind adherence to the heritage of the past.
He remembered the traditional saying of the Prophet: Indeed, he wanted to reconstruct all his knowledge from its very foundation and was led to make the following reflections: In the second place I ought to recognize that certitude is the clear and complete knowledge of things, such knowledge as leaves no room for doubt, nor any possibility of error.
No eye can perceive the movement of a shadow, still the shadow moves; a small coin would cover any star yet the geometrical computations show that a star is a world vastly larger than the earth.
Is ten more than three? Can a thing both be and not be at the same time or be both necessary and impossible? How could he tell? He believed in the testimony of senses till it was contradicted by the verdict of reason. Well, perhaps there is above reason another judge who if he appeared would convict reason of falsity and if such a third arbiter is not yet apparent it does not follow that he does not exist.
One may be tempted to say that his keenly alert and sensitive mind, though, exposed from early youth to all the various intellectual and spiritual movements of the times such as scholasticism, rationalism, mysticism, etc.
Ambitious and self-confident, he had been in a way playing with the various influences rather than affected exclusively by anyone of them. His restless soul had always been trying to reach for what it had not attained. He had been moving through them all these years, studying them very closely in his quest for certainty, and of them he now gives us a critical evaluation in a summary fashion.
His criticism of the theologians is very mild. He himself had been brought up in their tradition and was thoroughly saturated into their system.
It is doubtful if he ever parted company with them completely. He did not cease to be a theologian even when he became a mystic and his criticism of the philosophers was essentially from the standpoint of a theologian. Only he was dissatisfied with the scholastic method of the theologians, for it could not bring any intellectual certainty; their doctrines, he deemed, however, to be correct. His belief in God, Prophecy, and Last Judgment were too deeply rooted in him to be shaken altogether; his scepticism with regard to them, if at all, was a temporary phase; he only very much desired a confirmation of these fundamental beliefs either on some philosophical grounds or through some sort of first-hand experience.
The claims of the mystics he knew could not be challenged by one who lacked their experiences. It was the fourth class of the seekers of truth, namely, the philosophers, who engaged his attention most of all and troubled his mind more than anyone else.
He was not at all against philosophical investigation as such. In the history of Muslim thought his is the first instance of a theologian who was thoroughly schooled in the ways of the philosophers; the doctors of Islam before him either had a dread of philosophy, considering it a dangerous study, or dabbled in it just to qualify themselves for polemics against the philosophers. He applied himself so assiduously to the study of the entire sweep of Greek philosophy current in his time and attained such a firm grasp of its problems and methods 29 that he produced one of the best compendia of it in Arabic entitled as Maqasid al-Falasifah The Intentions of the Philosophers.
Albert the Great d. The materialists completely dispensed with the idea of God and believed that the universe has existed eternally without a creator: The naturalists or the deists, struck by the wonders of creation and informed of a running purpose and wisdom in the scheme of things while engaged in their manifold researches into the sciences of phenomena, admitted the existence of a wise Creator or Deity, but rejected the spirituality and immortality of the human soul.
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle he listed as theists but concentrated on Aristotle who had criticized all his predecessors and even had refuted his own teacher, excusing himself of this by saying: And truth is dear, too. Nay, truth is dearer than Plato.
He divided the philosophical sciences into mathematics, logic, physics, politics, ethics, and metaphysics, and went into their details in order to see if there really was anything false or untenable. He was most scientific in his approach: He had least hesitation in accepting as true much of what the philosophers taught with regard to their sciences of mathematics, logic, and physics; he even had no serious quarrel with them in the spheres of politics and ethics. The most grievous errors of the theistic philosophers, he found, consisted in their metaphysical views which, unlike mathematical and natural sciences, were not grounded in compelling reason or positive inquiry but on conjecture and fanciful speculations.
Had their metaphysics been so very well grounded in sound reasoning as their mathematical sciences were, they would have agreed amongst themselves on metaphysical issues as they did on the mathematical ones.
His empirical and theological spirit revolted very strongly against this. The positive facts of religion could not be sacrificed for sheer metaphysical speculations, nor could they be interpreted externally from the point of view of a preconceived system of philosophy.
These had to be interpreted intrinsically and reckoned on their own grounds. The Muslim philosophers had failed to take this empirical standpoint. For the rest their views are heretical or born of religious indifference. But in all they are involved in contradictions and suffer from confusion of thought. This has been one of the most challenging and uncompromising problems in the conflict between religion and philosophy. The advocates of orthodoxy considered the eternality of the universe to be the most pernicious thesis of the philosophers and vehemently combated against it.
To make anything co-eternal with God is to violate the strict principle of monotheism, for that infringes the absoluteness and infinity of God and reduces Him to the position of an artificer: As a corollary they believed in the infinity of time.
He created not only forms but also matter and time along with them which had a definite beginning and hence is finite. He clearly says that he does not have any quarrel with the philosophers on the usages of terms. The faulty reasonings of the philosophers or the inconsistencies in their positions are remediable but not so the uncritical acceptance of their assumptions. On the other hand, he is not prepared to reject any of the doctrines of religion until and unless it is disproved with a similar logical rigour and cogency.
Apparently, this is a double-faced criterion to judge variously the truths of philosophic assumptions and those of religious assumptions, but from the point of view of philosophy of religion it is perfectly justified. Philosopher qua philosopher has to accept the facts of religion as given by religion; this is the sine qua non of any empirical philosophy of religion.
Eternity of the World. These they take to be true axiomatically: If this cause arose from an act of will by God at some specific time, then the divine will itself should have been determined by some other cause.
This cause which led God to change His mind should certainly be outside His mind; but again this was not possible, for nothing outside Him yet existed.
Thus, one is forced to conclude that either nothing ever arose from the being of God-which is not true, for the world does existor that the world must have been in existence from all eternity, as an immediate effect of His eternal will. The assumptions of the philosophers, that every effect has a cause and that a cause is a force external to its effect, do not have a logical coerciveness about them.
God, for example, can eternally will that Socrates and Plato should be born at such and such a time and that the one should be born before the other. Hence it is not logically illegitimate to affirm the orthodox belief that God eternally willed that the world should come into being at such and such a definite moment in time. But the philosophers point out a real difficulty here. All moments of time are completely similar; how is it possible to choose between two completely similar things?
Why, in short, was the world not created earlier or later than when it was created? It is noteworthy that this is exactly the argument given by Kant in the thesis of his first antinomy.
His will does not depend upon distinctions in the outside world, for it is itself the producer of all the distinctions therein. God chooses a particular moment for the creation of the universe as He chooses a particular direction for the movement of the spheres of the Ptolemaic heaven, in some cases from east to west, in others from west to east as described in the Aristotelian astronomy even when the reversal of directions would have made no difference.
God, according to them, possesses the knowledge of all the universals without this knowledge necessitating plurality, without its being additional to His essence, and without its multiplying in proportion to the multiplicity of the objects known. Some of them assert after Aristotle that God is the knower, the knowledge, and the known, and that the three are one.
Is it sense to speak of a creation of that which exists eternally? If God and the prime matter are both eternal existents, does it make sense to say that one is the cause of the other? Can the relation between two existents qua existents be regarded as a causal one? Further, the philosophers put different constructions upon their notions of space and time.
They assume time to be infinite and space to be finite, and yet consider time to be co-implicant of movement in space. One further point of criticism may, however, be added for its importance in the history of modern philosophy.
It is impossible that it should have been impossible; for that which is impossible in itself is never brought into existence.
Again, it is impossible for it to have been necessary in itself, for that which is necessary in itself is never deprived of existence. It follows then that the existence of the world must have always been possible in itself, otherwise it would never have come to be.
This possibility cannot inhere in possibility itself, nor in the agent, nor in no-substratum, for the possible is that which is in the process of becoming actual. Hence the subject of possibility is some substratum which is susceptible of possibility, and this is matter. Now, this matter cannot be considered to have been originated. In that case possibility would have existed in itself, but possibility existing in itself is unintelligible. Hence matter is eternal and it is only the passing over of the forms to matter which is originated.
If possibility requires an existent to correspond to it, so would impossibility require something to correspond to it, but avowedly there is no existing thing in concrete reality to which impossibility may be referred.
Hence possibility like impossibility is merely a concept; the assumption of an existing substratum to which this concept may be related is to have a metaphysical jump from mere thought to actual existence and is to commit as we understand now an ontological fallacy.
Plotinus considers the world to be a necessary outflow from the being of God like light from the sun 48 or better as Spinoza described it later like the properties of a triangle from a triangle. The problem of emanation with the philosophers, however, arises because of their over-emphasis on the abstract unity and absolute perfection of God. Creation through an act of volition implies both will and knowledge, and these cannot be predicated of God as attributes apart from His essence without doing violence to His absolute unity.
Further, both will and knowledge are limitations: This staircase is constituted of a finely graded series of intelligences and souls of celestial spheres, each emanating from the other in an hierarchical fashion.
The view that the celestial spheres are perfect and have souls and intelligences superior to that of man had the overwhelming authority of Aristotle 50 and further it was possible and even fascinating to conceive of them in terms of angels as described by the theologians.
The emanationism of the Muslim philosophers in the final analysis worked under two governing principles: First, it is not thinkable that from God who is a pure unity anything could proceed except that which is itself a unity.
This gave rise to the formula: Secondly, being has two aspects: In the case of God alone are essence and existence identical; in all other beings essence is separate from existence. From this it follows that all things are possible by their essence, and they become necessary by the existence given to them by God.
Its existence is possible in itself and necessary through the First Principle; further, it knows its own essence as well as the essence of the First Principle. From its twofold existence and two-fold knowledge springs a multiplicity of knowledge and existence. The first intelligence, in fact, has three kinds of knowledge: What is the source of this three-foldness in the first intelligence when the principle from which it emanates is one? From the First Principle only one proceeds, i. Now, its knowledge of its principle is evidently necessary, although this necessity is not derived from that principle.
Again, being possible in itself the first intelligence cannot owe its possibility to the First Principle but possesses it in its own self. Though only one should proceed from one, yet it is possible that the first effect may come to possess not from the First Principle but by itself certain necessary qualities which express some relation or negation of relation and give rise to plurality.
Thus, from the three kinds of knowledge possessed by the first intelligence emanate three beings, but only one from each kind. As it knows its principle there proceeds from it a second intelligence; as it knows its essence there proceeds from it the first soul of the highest sphere which is the ninth heaven ; and as it knows itself as possible in itself there proceeds from it the body of that sphere.
In a similar fashion from the second intelligence emanates the third intelligence, the soul of the stellar sphere and the body of that sphere. From the third intelligence emanates the fourth intelligence, the soul of the sphere of Saturn and the body of that sphere.
From the fourth intelligence emanates the fifth intelligence, the soul of the sphere of Jupiter and the body of that sphere. Now there are, according to the then current Ptolemaic system, only nine celestial spheres in all including the sphere of the fixed stars all in concentric circles with earth in the centre. The composition and decomposition of the elements is the cause of generation and corruption of all bodies.
But all these transformations take place under the influence of the movement of the spheres. It gives to each matter its proper form and it also gives each body a soul which in fact is its form when that body is ready to receive it. Thus, active intellect is also the source of the existence of the human souls. But the human soul does not feel at home in its physical abode and yearns for nothing less than the First Principle Himself. Hence it starts its spiritual journey back to the original source traversing through the various stages of the intelligences of the spheres.
This is a rounded though brief description of the emanationistic world-view so enthusiastically elaborated by the Muslim philosophers, by ibn Sina, for example, in both of his major works on philosophy, viz. All this, he inveighs, is arbitrary reasoning, idle speculation; a wild guess work; darkness piled upon darkness.
If someone says he saw things of this kind in a dream, it would be inferred that he was suffering from some disease. Even an insane person could not rest satisfied with such postulates. If the formula ever so glibly repeated that from one only one proceeds should be observed strictly logically, then all the beings in the world would be units, each of which would be an effect of some other unit above it, as it would be the cause of some other unit below it in a linear fashion. But in fact this is not the case.
Every object, according to the philosophers themselves, is composed at least of form and matter. How does a composite thing such as a body then come into existence? Does it have only one cause? If the answer is in the affirmative, then the assertion that only one proceeds from one becomes null and void. If, on the other hand, a composite thing has a composite cause, then the same question will be repeated in the case of this cause so on and so forth till one arrives at a point where the compound necessarily meets the simple.
This contact between the compound effect and the unitary cause wherever it occurs would falsify the principle that only one proceeds from one. Now, strictly speaking, all the existents in the universe are characterized by composition and only the First Principle, i. But the philosophers cloak the issue with their artificial subtleties and the grandiose constructions they put upon their emanationistic foundations.
Neither logic nor experience can substantiate this wild supposition and as such it is no more than pure nonsense. Further, how is it possible that from two kinds of knowledge of the first intelligence, that is, knowledge of the First Principle and that of itself, should arise two kinds of existence, first, that of the second intelligence and, second, that of the soul of the highest sphere?
How can the knowledge of a thing lead to the existence of a thing as we would now put it after Kant without committing an obvious ontological fallacy? Tennant, and like him deplores that of all the people, philosophers should believe in such mythical nonsense.
Even if the triplicity with which the philosophers characterize the first intelligence should be taken for granted which indeed cannot be done it fails to account for all that they want to deduce from it. The body of the highest sphere, which according to them proceeds only from one aspect of the essence of the first intelligence, is surely not unitary in nature but composite and that in three ways.
True, form and matter always exist conjointly in all bodies, yet they are so different from each other that one cannot be the cause of the other. Hence, form and matter of the body of the highest sphere require two principles for their existence and not one.
A unitary aspect of the three-fold character of the first intelligence fails to account for it. Secondly, the body of this sphere has a definite size. Its having a definite size is something additional to the bare fact of its existence. Certainly, it could have come into existence with a different size, bigger or smaller than what it is. Hence, over and above that which necessitated the existence of the body of the sphere, there should be an additional cause to account for the adoption of this particular size.
Thirdly, in the highest heaven, there are marked out two points as its poles, which are fixed. This fact was admitted by the philosophers in accordance with the Aristotelian astronomy.
Now, either all the parts of the highest sphere are similar in which case it is impossible to explain why two points should be chosen in perference to all the others as its poles; or they are different, some of them possessing properties which are not possessed by the others.
Hence, we require yet another aspect in the first intelligence to be the cause for differences in the various parts of the highest sphere which differences alone would justify the choice of two points therein to be the poles. The above principle certainly collapses when we come to the second intelligence, for it is supposed to be, in one of its aspects, the cause of the sphere of the fixed stars.
All this necessitates a bewildering multiplicity in the second intelligence and also indirectly presupposes the same in the first intelligence in so far as the latter is the emanative cause of the former. Should the above arguments fail to convince the philosophers, there is another way to show that the first intelligence is more than a mere triplicity.
Is the self-knowledge of the first intelligence identical with its essence or other than it? It is not possible that it should be identical, for knowledge is not the same thing as that which is known.
Hence, the first intelligence is not a triplicity but a quadruplicity, to wit: To all these four aspects there can be added yet another, namely, its being a necessary being whose necessity is derived from an external cause. All this proves that the first intelligence has five aspects and not three, as arbitrarily assumed by the philosophers. This shows that there is something in the effect which is not present in the cause, i. There is no reason, according to him, that the very arguments which the philosophers advance to establish the triple character of the first intelligence should not be applied to God Himself.
One of the aspects of plurality in the first intelligence according to the philosophers is its being a possible existent by itself. It may be asked: Is its being possible identical with its existence or other than it? If it is identical, no plurality would arise from it. If it is other than its existence, then why should it not be possible to say that there is as much plurality in the First Principle, i.
The necessity of existence as such is other than existence itself. In truth, existence may be considered to be a generic concept divided into necessary and possible. If one specific difference is an addition to existence per se in one case, it should be considered so in the other also. If the philosophers insist that the possibility of existence is other than existence in the case of the first intelligence, through the same argument they should admit that necessity of existence is different from existence in the case of the First Principle.
If it is identical, then there will be no plurality in its nature. But if it is other than the two, then such a plurality exists also in the First Principle, for He too knows Himself as well as what is other than Himself. The impossibility of such a belief is neither a self-evident truth, nor a matter of inferential knowledge. The philosophers try to avoid the charge of plurality with regard to the First Principle so far as His knowledge is concerned by affirming that the First Principle does not know anything other than Himself and that His self-knowledge is the same thing as His essence; so the knowledge, the knower, and the object of knowledge are all one in Him.
This indeed was originally the position of Aristotle according to whom God is describable as thought thinking itself. According to him, self-knowledge of a literal and direct sort is An impossibility. Not only the Aristotelian conception of God as thought thinking thought does not absolve the philosophers from introducing plurality in the First Principle, but further lends them into many more difficulties with regard to their emanationistic world-view.
Consider, for example, the relative positions of the First Principle and the first intelligence in terms of their knowledge. The necessity of a cause possessing the knowledge of its effect is more compelling than the necessity of an effect possessing the knowledge of its cause.
Further, the First Principle does not know what prodeeds from Him; in fact, He does not know anything other than Himself, while the first intelligence knows itself, its cause, and its three effects. This means that God cannot have the perceptual knowledge of particular things but knows them by way of a universal knowledge. Ibn Sina realizes the difficulty of his position and so adds that the understanding of it needs great intellectual subtlety. Perceptual knowledge is characterized both temporally and spatially, whereas God is above both time and space and so it is not possible to ascribe perceptual knowledge to Him.
A particular event occurs at a particular moment of time and suffers change with the passage of time. Change in the object of perception implies a change in the content of perception itself which obviously leads to change in the subject of perception, i. Similarly, to distinguish between one particular object and another in space is possible only through the senses and implies a special relation of a sensible thing to the percipient as being near to or far from him or in a definite position, and this is impossible where God is concerned.
Hence, it is not possible for God to have perceptual knowledge of the particulars. The theory implies that God cannot know any new state that emerges in John-He cannot know that John has becomes an infidel or a true believer, for He can know only the unbelief or the belief of man in general in a universal manner and not in specific relation to individuals.
And the same will be true of every other prophet, for God only knows that among men there are some who claim prophecy, and that such and such are their attributes; but He cannot know a particular prophet as an individual, for that is to be known only by the senses.
By the statement that God does not have perceptual knowledge of the particulars, ibn Sina does not mean to say that God does not have the knowledge of the particulars or that His knowledge is restricted only to that of the universals or general concepts. Ibn Sina insists that God does have knowledge of the particulars; only this knowledge comes to Him not through sensuous perception but through intellectual perception, not from moment to moment but eternally.
Ibn Sina starts with the Aristotelian conception that God has only self-knowledge but adds emphatically that His self-knowledge necessarily implies knowledge of all the existent things in the universe in so far as He is the principal or the ultimate source of them all.
There is not a single existent particular which does not proceed from Him directly or indirectly and the existence of which does not become in some way necessary through Him. The coming into existence of particular events and objects is due to the action and interaction of the various causes but ultimately all these have to be traced back to the First Cause. God, the First Cause, has the full prescience of the working of the various causes which originate from Him, and knows the effects produced by them and the time involved in their occurrence and recurrence.
Thus, God knows the particular events even when they occur to a single individual under specific conditions and at particular times in so far as they are fully explicable in terms of general laws and all-pervasive causal nexus. This may be illustrated with reference to an analogous human situation. The analogy, however, though helpful, cannot be stretched to an identity, for, strictly speaking, there is nothing in our experience to compare with divine knowledge. God is immediately aware of the entire sweep of history regarded as an ordered string of specific events in an eternal now.
Further, God not only knows but is also the very ground of the objects that He knows. The universe proceeds from the essence of God verily because of His knowledge of the universe: Had God not known the universe with all its concrete particularities, the universe would never have come into being. He is not at all prepared to accept any of the assumptions of the philosophers until and unless they should either be atatable in the form of analytical propositions or be verifiable through some kind of intuitive experience.
Now, the statement of the philosophers that God knows Himself directly only as the principle of the universe, according to al- Gh azali, is as much an arbitrary assumption as the earlier statement and is exposed to exactly the same kind of criticism.
The principle or cause is merely the relation that He bears to His effect, the universe. His knowledge of His relation to the universe is not by any means entailed by His knowledge of His own essence.
Do not the philosophers themselves in their doctrine with regard to the attributes of God affirm the possibility only of negative or relational statements about God on the plea that negations or relations add nothing to His essence? If the change in the objects of cognition necessarily presupposes change in the subject, multiplicity and difference in the former presuppose the same in the latter. Verily the difference and the disparity among the diverse Genera and Species is more marked than the difference which may actually be found to exist among the states of a thing divisible in accordance with the division of time.
If that difference does not necessitate multiplicity and difference, how can this do so either? Though the philosophers ascribe omniscience and fore-knowledge to God, they make His knowledge a sort of mirror which passively reflects in an eternal now the details of an already finished sequence of events just as we in a particular present moment have the memory of a fixed and inalterable sequence of past events. There is, however, another aspect of time which typically characterizes the human experience and forms its very essence, namely, that of the ever-fleeting, ever-changing now.
This is the time which is born afresh at every moment, the time in which the future is perpetually flowing through the present into the past. God may know, for example, that my acts of religious devotion are subsequent to my religious conversion, but He cannot know now that I am acting or have acted in such and such a way. So God in His supra-temporal transcendence would remain impervious to my religious solicitations, for I am eternally doomed to the tyranny of this ever-fleeting, ever-trembling now.
It may be suggested, however, that God is transcendental to both time and change and yet in some mysterious way immanent in it. We do not say that knowledge of light possessed by the sun is the requisite condition for the emanation of light from the sun, and this in fact is the analogy which the philosophers have employed to explain the procession of the world from the being of God.
That which proceeds from something which proceeds from God may not be necessarily known to Him. Knowledge is not necessary in the case of the indirect consequences of volitional actions; how can it be so in the case of the indirect consequences of necessary actions? Through a strange irony of logic the emanationistic argument of the philosophers, instead of building a staircase between God and the world, creates almost an unbridgeable gulf between the two.
It certainly leads to the conclusion that God is directly related only to the first intelligence, i. Further, the argument makes the world an independent and autonomous system, which can be understood by itself because of its insistence on an inexorable causal necessity such as pervades the entire scheme of things. He challenges the validity of this necessity right as he opens the discussion.
The affirmation of the one does not imply the affirmation of the other, nor does the denial of the one imply the denial of the other. Neither the existence nor the non-existence of the one is necessarily presupposed by the existence or the non-existence of the other.
The relation between quenching of thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and fire, or light and sunrise, etc. There is nothing logically contradictory in assuming that fire may not burn, and drinking may not quench thirst, and so on. At best it is based on observation or experience. We observe that objects succeed one another or that similar objects are constantly conjoined. The notion of necessity is valid only in the case of logical relations such as identity, implication, disjunction, etc.
In the sphere of mere natural relations necessity has no scope. In the order of nature, unlike the order of thought, we deal merely with the contingent and alogical entities which remain unrelated to each other except in the minds of the perceiver. Objects as such are not connected with one another; only the ideas of them get connected in our mind by association. The relation between fire and burning is not a necessary relation, for it does not belong to the realm of necessity but to that of possibility such as may happen or may not happen depending on the will of God.
Causal necessity is just the habit of our mind: The psychological necessity differs from logical necessity in this that its denial like the latter does not involve us in a logical impossibility. Hence the miracles, such as the fire not burning the body of Abraham when he was thrown into it, are not impossible to think.
Cause he understands to be the sum total of many contributory factors, some of which are positive while others negative, and all of which have to be considered in conjunction. Take the case of a man seeing a coloured object: The relation of cause and effect is based on observation and observation as such does not rule out the possibility that the same effect might follow some cause other than the apparent one.
Even where we recognize that there are many causes for the same effect, we cannot limit the number of causes just to those which we ourselves have observed. So there are many causes for the same effect 73 and a cause is a sum total of many conditions.
In view of this it is not possible to negate an effect on the negation of one particular cause but on the negation of all the various causes.
Moreover, causes by themselves are inert entities; will and action cannot be attributed to them. They act only through the power and agency of God. Such a standpoint may make one sceptical of the phenomena of nature, but it may equally lead one to an acute mystical sense of the presence of God to all things. Scepticism of this kind and mysticism need not always be antithetical-the former may as well lead to the latter. This is only a part of the truth; his own confessional statement to this effect in al-Munqidh seems to be rather an over-statement of the actual facts.
Sufistic influences had all along been working upon his mind right from his early childhood. His Sufi-mysticism was as much influenced by his thorough study of philosophy as by theology; in its final development it was the mysticism of a philosopher and a theologian. There is a marked note of Hellenic thought in his mystical doctrines and even the tracings of Neo-Platonism, and yet paradoxical though it may seem they remain circumscribed within the limits of orthodoxy.
His is surely a sober kind of mysticism carefully eschewing all kinds of pantheistic extravagances and severely criticizing the antinomian tendencies of the intoxicated Sufis. On the one hand, he tried to make mysticism orthodox and, on the other, orthodoxy mystical. It is the mystical element in religion, he insisted, which is most vital and makes religious life a reality.
From the point of view of our present study his mystical views with regard to God and soul may be profitably compared with those of the philosophers, i.
No positive attributes can be ascribed to God for that leads to the subject-predicate dualism. Even existence can only be referred to Him. He is above all distinctions and above all the categories of thought. This overemphasis on unity shorn of all qualities reduces God to a mere contentless inanity.
He becomes an ineffable, indescribable, impredicable something. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, some if them, following Aristotle, have described God as thought thinking thought. That which He knows comes into being emanating from the over-effulgence of His Being, but He does not positively will anything, for willing implies a need-a deficiency.
He recognizes only Himself or at best His first emanent, the first intelligence, and, thus, is purely transcendent to this world of change and multiplicity. God is the sole-existent and the ultimate cause and ground of all being, the only self-subsisting reality.
We should, however, understand that all His attributes are spiritual. He is perfect goodness and perfect beauty: According to the philosophers, God wills the world because He thinks of it. He is exalted beyond the limitations of space and time, for He is the creator of space and time.
He was before time and space were. But He is also immanent in this apatio-temporal order; His eternal wisdom and supreme beauty manifest themselves through the wonders and glory of His creation. His eternal will is in action throughout the universe; it is in the swing of the sun and the moon and in the alternation of day and night.
Everywhere around is the touch and working of God. He desires intercourse with His creatures and makes it possible for them to enter into fellowship with Himself through prayer and contemplation and, above all, through the gift of mystical gnosis.
He only insists, like Kant, 7 that the philosophers through their rational arguments cannot give any conclusive proof for the spirituality, substantiality, unity, immortality, etc. His attack on the philosophers on this issue is as incisive and analytic as that of Kant but probably more violent. He actually smashes one by one all the ten arguments which he himself expounds as forcefully as they could be in favour of their thesis. He even joins the philosophers in their refutation of the position of some of the scholastic theologians, who maintained that the soul is a kind of subtle body or an accident and not a substance.
The interesting thing about this conception is that it runs parallel to his conception of God. Soul like God is a unity and like Him it is primarily and essentially a will. Further, as God is both transcendent to and immanent in the universe so is soul with reference to body. The soul of man is different from everything else in the sensuous world.
There are two worlds: Soul belongs to the world of amr also because it proceeds from the command of God: It is the world of amr that rules the created world; the command is the divine force which directs and regulates the world. Thus soul is a spiritual principle which having life in itself vitalizes the body and controls it and regulates it. Body is the instrument and vehicle of the soul. God is primarily a will and man is akin to God especially in respect of will.
Man in himself has the infinite spiritual possibilities and it is through his will that he comes to realize them and thus brings himself close to the mind and will of God till God says: So enter among My servants and enter My garden. Religious Experience and Moral and Intellectual Values. It is a vital experience which must translate itself into good action. The life of the true mystics is the best life and their character the purest character.
In the final analysis the mystics themselves are illumined by the light of the lamp of the prophetic revelation. But what if you were to doubt the prophethood of a prophet? So close is the relation between the inner religious life and the outer moral expression of it that you can move from one back to the other. The authenticity of a prophet can be attested by applying a moral test, that is, by making a close study of his conduct, by assessing the transformations which his creative will has wrought in human history and by evaluating the new socio-politico-legal system that he has introduced and established in a society.
Of the truths of religion, we acquire not a theoretical but a moral certainty: Though the philosophers do not deny the importance of transforming truth values into moral values, ideas into deeds, so far as their theory of prophecy is concerned, yet in pursuance of the dominant Hellenic tradition they seem to hold that knowledge without consequent action has its own intrinsic value. Good deeds are preparatory to correct thinking. The ultimate perfection of the soul consists in God-like contemplation, in a state of pure knowledge which though not without joy is certainly without action.
It is indeed futile to look for any lifeless consistency in his attitudes which make a happy synthesis of voluntarism, pragmatism, and idealism. He concedes, for example, that a prophet is a person endowed with extraordinary intellect which enables him to attain contact with the active intellect, the proximate source of prophetic revelation.
The study of all branches of knowledge and taking the greatest share of most of them is a necessary part of the mystic discipline. Many Sufis remain stuck for years in such figments of imagination, but they certainly would have been saved from these, had they first followed the path of scientific study and acquired by laborious learning as much of the demonstrative sciences as human power could encompass.
The anti-intellectualism or the anti-liberalism of the Muslim community is a highly complex sociological phenomenon and its causes shall have to be explored in a great many areas; it would be too much of an oversimplification of facts to ascribe it to a single name, however great that name may be.
Considering, however, the number and complexity of the subjects with which his works deal, the various levels of readers for whom they were written and the fact of his own spiritual development, it is not always possible to reconcile his various views and attitudes and to defend him against all charges of inconsistency. But it has been pointed out that in his doctrine of the soul he makes it resemble God so closely both in essence and qualities that there remains hardly any difference between the two.
If the contingency of the world should be over-emphasized, it becomes nothing more than a show of shadows having no reality or actuality of its own whatsoever.
All actuality is devoured by the being of God. He is that He is: Statements of this kind clearly indicate a sense of complete self-deification. Call me happy, but ask me no more.
But there are some critics 31 who have recently made attempts to belittle the importance of his ethical theory by trying to show that it is entirely, or at least mainly, derived from the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic doctrines and from the writings of the Muslim philosophers whose systems were Hellenic in spirit. He was, in fact, against the philosophers and their heretical doctrines.
Although three of four studies in the memory domain reported a significant benefit of higher PA, there was only one significant ES, which favoured low PA. Only one study examining processing speed had a significant ES, favouring higher PA. A limited body of evidence supports a positive effect of PA on CF in young to middle-aged adults.
Further research into this relationship at this age stage is warranted. Significant positive effects of PA on cognitive function were found in 12 of the 14 included manuscripts, the relationship being most consistent for executive function, intermediate for memory and weak for processing speed. A meta-analysis including the evaluation of control group response".
Exercise has established efficacy as an antidepressant in people with depression. Exercise significantly improved physical and psychological domains and overall QoL. The lack of improvement among control groups reinforces the role of exercise as a treatment for depression with benefits to QoL.
Research investigating the effects of exercise on older adults has primarily focused on brain structural and functional changes with relation to cognitive improvement. In particular, several cross-sectional and intervention studies have shown a positive association between physical activity and cognition in older persons  and an inverse correlation with cognitive decline and dementia . Older adults enrolled in a 6-month aerobic fitness intervention increased brain volume in both gray matter anterior cingulate cortex, supplementary motor area, posterior middle frontal gyrus, and left superior temporal lobe and white matter anterior third of corpus callosum .
In addition, Colcombe and colleagues showed that older adults with higher cardiovascular fitness levels are better at activating attentional resources, including decreased activation of the anterior cingulated cortex. One of the possible mechanisms by which physical activity may benefit cognition is that physical activity maintains brain plasticity, increases brain volume, stimulates neurogenesis and synaptogenesis, and increases neurotrophic factors in different areas of the brain, possibly providing reserve against later cognitive decline and dementia [89, 90].
A large collection of research in humans has shown that a single bout of exercise alters behavior at the level of affective state and cognitive functioning in several key ways. In terms of affective state, acute exercise decreases negative affect, increases positive affect, and decreases the psychological and physiological response to acute stress . These effects have been reported to persist for up to 24 hours after exercise cessation [28, 29, 53].
In terms of cognitive functioning, acute exercise primarily enhances executive functions dependent on the prefrontal cortex including attention, working memory, problem solving, cognitive flexibility, verbal fluency, decision making, and inhibitory control .
These positive changes have been demonstrated to occur with very low to very high exercise intensities , with effects lasting for up to two hours after the end of the exercise bout Fig. Moreover, many of these neuropsychological assessments measure several aspects of behavior including both accuracy of performance and speed of processing. McMorris and Hale performed a meta-analysis examining the effects of acute exercise on both accuracy and speed of processing, revealing that speed significantly improved post-exercise, with minimal or no effect on accuracy .
These authors concluded that increasing task difficulty or complexity may help to augment the effect of acute exercise on accuracy. Arq Bras Endocrinol Metabol in Portuguese. Interestingly, some symptoms of OT are related to beta-endorphin beta-end effects.
Some of its effects, such as analgesia, increasing lactate tolerance, and exercise-induced euphoria, are important for training. The runner's high describes a euphoric state resulting from long-distance running. Scand J Med Sci Sports. This systematic review and meta-analysis found that physical activity reduced depressive symptoms among people with a psychiatric illness.
The current meta-analysis differs from previous studies, as it included participants with depressive symptoms with a variety of psychiatric diagnoses except dysthymia and eating disorders.
This review provides strong evidence for the antidepressant effect of physical activity; however, the optimal exercise modality, volume, and intensity remain to be determined. Conclusion Few interventions exist whereby patients can hope to achieve improvements in both psychiatric symptoms and physical health simultaneously without significant risks of adverse effects.
Physical activity offers substantial promise for improving outcomes for people living with mental illness, and the inclusion of physical activity and exercise programs within treatment facilities is warranted given the results of this review.
Consistent evidence indicates that exercise improves cognition and mood, with preliminary evidence suggesting that brain-derived neurotrophic factor BDNF may mediate these effects. The aim of the current meta-analysis was to provide an estimate of the strength of the association between exercise and increased BDNF levels in humans across multiple exercise paradigms. Moderators of this effect were also examined. Effect size analysis supports the role of exercise as a strategy for enhancing BDNF activity in humans.
This omission is relevant, given the evidence that aerobic-based physical activity generates structural changes in the brain, such as neurogenesis, angiogenesis, increased hippocampal volume, and connectivity 12, In children, a positive relationship between aerobic fitness, hippocampal volume, and memory has been found 12, Mental health outcomes included reduced depression and increased self-esteem, although no change was found in anxiety levels This systematic review of the literature found that [aerobic physical activity APA ] is positively associated with cognition, academic achievement, behavior, and psychosocial functioning outcomes.
Importantly, Shephard also showed that curriculum time reassigned to APA still results in a measurable, albeit small, improvement in academic performance The actual aerobic-based activity does not appear to be a major factor; interventions used many different types of APA and found similar associations. In positive association studies, intensity of the aerobic activity was moderate to vigorous.
The amount of time spent in APA varied significantly between studies; however, even as little as 45 minutes per week appeared to have a benefit. Considered overall, the studies included in the present review showed a strong effectiveness of exercise combined with antidepressants. Conclusions This is the first review to have focused on exercise as an add-on strategy in the treatment of MDD.
Our findings corroborate some previous observations that were based on few studies and which were difficult to generalize.
Moreover, we hypothesize that the main role of exercise on treatment-resistant depression is in inducing neurogenesis by increasing BDNF expression, as was demonstrated by several recent studies. A Clinical Review and Management Guideline". Keeping in mind that exercise shows no medication side effects such as withdrawal symptoms 20 , weight gain, dry mouth or insomnia 21 , but shows potential health benefits such as weight reduction, it is highly recommended to use exercise as an adjunctive treatment for depression New findings confirm that exercise can be recommended as a first-line treatment for mild to moderate depression; as an adjunct to medications 23 ; as an alternative to cognitive behavioral therapy 11 ; and in preventing depression in clinical as well as healthy populations 24— Although recent findings have shown that exercise can decrease depressive symptoms, there are still many questions and limitations to wider application of exercise in depression.
For instance, there are deficiencies in methodological planning such as uncontrolled nonrandomized trials, small sample sizes, inadequate allocation concealment, lack of intention-to-treat analyses, non-blinded outcome assessments, and inclusion of subjects without clinical diagnosis that limit the interpretability of research outcomes The effects of physical exercise on cognition and behavior in children and adults with ADHD: The present review summarises the impact of exercise interventions 1—10 weeks in duration with at least two sessions each week on parameters related to ADHD in 7-to year-old children.
We may conclude that all different types of exercise here yoga, active games with and without the involvement of balls, walking and athletic training attenuate the characteristic symptoms of ADHD and improve social behaviour, motor skills, strength and neuropsychological parameters without any undesirable side effects.
Available reports do not reveal which type, intensity, duration and frequency of exercise is most effective in this respect and future research focusing on this question with randomised and controlled long-term interventions is warranted.
Lay summary — Exercise may improve thinking ability and memory 27 December In patients with MCI, exercise training 6 months is likely to improve cognitive measures and cognitive training may improve cognitive measures.
Clinicians should recommend regular exercise Level B. Exercise generally had a positive effect on rate of cognitive decline in AD. A meta-analysis found that exercise interventions have a positive effect on global cognitive function, 0. Cognitive decline in AD is attributable at least in part to the buildup of amyloid and tau proteins, which promote neuronal dysfunction and death Hardy and Selkoe, ; Karran et al.
Evidence in transgenic mouse models of AD, in which the mice have artificially elevated amyloid load, suggests that exercise programs are able to improve cognitive function Adlard et al. Adlard and colleagues also determined that the improvement in cognitive performance occurred in conjunction with a reduced amyloid load. Research that includes direct indices of change in such biomarkers will help to determine the mechanisms by which exercise may act on cognition in AD.
Am J Occup Ther. All studies included people with AD who completed an exercise program consisting of aerobic, strength, or balance training or any combination of the three. The length of the exercise programs varied from 12 weeks to 12 months. Six studies involving participants tested the effect of exercise on ADL performance These positive effects were apparent with programs ranging in length from 12 wk Santana-Sosa et al.
Furthermore, the positive effects of a 3-mo intervention lasted 24 mo Teri et al. No adverse effects of exercise on ADL performance were noted.
The study with the largest effect size implemented a walking and aerobic program of only 30 min four times a week Venturelli et al.
Cochrane Database Syst Rev. A systematic review and meta-analysis of longitudinal studies". Longitudinal observational studies show an association between higher levels of physical activity and a reduced risk of cognitive decline and dementia. A case can be made for a causal interpretation. Future research should use objective measures of physical activity, adjust for the full range of confounders and have adequate follow-up length.
Ideally, randomised controlled trials will be conducted. On the whole the results do, however, lend support to the notion of a causal relationship between physical activity, cognitive decline and dementia, according to the established criteria for causal inference. Role in Drug Addiction and Novel Treatments". There is accelerating evidence that physical exercise is a useful treatment for preventing and reducing drug addiction In some individuals, exercise has its own rewarding effects, and a behavioral economic interaction may occur, such that physical and social rewards of exercise can substitute for the rewarding effects of drug abuse.
The value of this form of treatment for drug addiction in laboratory animals and humans is that exercise, if it can substitute for the rewarding effects of drugs, could be self-maintained over an extended period of time. Work to date in [laboratory animals and humans] regarding exercise as a treatment for drug addiction supports this hypothesis.
However, a RTC study was recently reported by Rawson et al. Animal and human research on physical exercise as a treatment for stimulant addiction indicates that this is one of the most promising treatments on the horizon.
Similar to environmental enrichment, studies have found that exercise reduces self-administration and relapse to drugs of abuse Cosgrove et al. There is also some evidence that these preclinical findings translate to human populations, as exercise reduces withdrawal symptoms and relapse in abstinent smokers Daniel et al. In humans, the role of dopamine signaling in incentive-sensitization processes has recently been highlighted by the observation of a dopamine dysregulation syndrome in some patients taking dopaminergic drugs.
This syndrome is characterized by a medication-induced increase in or compulsive engagement in non-drug rewards such as gambling, shopping, or sex Evans et al. Am J Drug Alcohol Abuse.
The limited research conducted suggests that exercise may be an effective adjunctive treatment for SUDs. In contrast to the scarce intervention trials to date, a relative abundance of literature on the theoretical and practical reasons supporting the investigation of this topic has been published. From human to animal studies". As briefly reviewed above, a large number of human and rodent studies clearly show that there are sex differences in drug addiction and exercise.
The sex differences are also found in the effectiveness of exercise on drug addiction prevention and treatment, as well as underlying neurobiological mechanisms. The postulate that exercise serves as an ideal intervention for drug addiction has been widely recognized and used in human and animal rehabilitation.
In particular, more studies on the neurobiological mechanism of exercise and its roles in preventing and treating drug addiction are needed.
Sydor A, Brown RY, eds. A Foundation for Clinical Neuroscience 2nd ed. The clinical actions of fluoxetine, like those of many neuropharmacologic agents, reflect drug-induced neural plasticity, which is the process by which neurons adapt over time in response to chronic disturbance.
For example, evidence indicates that prolonged increases in cortisol may be damaging to hippocampal neurons and can suppress hippocampal neurogenesis the generation of new neurons postnatally. Neurotrophic factors are polypeptides or small proteins that support the growth, differentiation, and survival of neurons.
They produce their effects by activation of tyrosine kinases. Exercise-related improvements in brain function and structure may be conferred by the concurrent adaptations in vascular function and structure. Aerobic exercise increases the peripheral levels of growth factors e.
This finding has important implications in utilizing PA as a mediator factor for educational purposes in children, rehabilitation applications in patients, improving the cognitive abilities of the human brain such as in learning or memory, and preventing age-related brain deteriorations.
There is a significant association between the volume of the brain areas and their corresponding functions. Examples include the association of total and regional brain volumes BV with executive function and speed of processing, intelligence, working, verbal and spatial memory, and skill acquisition performance [27—29].
The connections between brain function and structure is due to the neural information processing being dependent on the size, arrangement, and configuration of the neurons, the number and type of the synaptic connections of the neurons, on the quality of their connection with distant neurons, and on the properties of non-neuronal cells such as glia . This study showed that PA is positively associating with nearly all brain regions.
Monoamines, Acetylcholine, and Orexin". Alterations in epigenetic modification patterns have been demonstrated to be dependent on exercise and growth hormone GH , insulin-like growth factor 1 IGF-1 , and steroid administration. Investigating the dentate gyrus, a brain region which is involved in learning and coping with stressful and traumatic events, they could show that this effect is mediated by increased phosphorylation of serine 10 combined with H3K14 acetylation, which is associated with local opening of condensed chromatin.
Consequently, they found increased immediate early gene expression as shown for c-FOS FBJ murine osteosarcoma viral oncogene homologue. In fact the decrease of circulating IGF-I during short-term training seems to be reflective of favorable neuromuscular anabolic adaptation and is a normal adaptive response to increased physical activity. The potential for exercise-induced increases in circulating IGF-I seems to require longer training duration Aerobic exercise [Increased GMV in: Higher Cognitive Function and Behavioral Control".
The anterior cingulate cortex is involved in processes that require correct decision-making, as seen in conflict resolution eg, the Stroop test, see in Chapter 16 , or cortical inhibition eg, stopping one task and switching to another. The medial prefrontal cortex is involved in supervisory attentional functions eg, action-outcome rules and behavioral flexibility the ability to switch strategies.
The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex , the last brain area to undergo myelination during development in late adolescence, is implicated in matching sensory inputs with planned motor responses. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex seems to regulate social cognition, including empathy. The orbitofrontal cortex is involved in social decision making and in representing the valuations assigned to different experiences.
There is weak evidence for the effect of acute bouts of physical activity on attention. Fortunately, the literature-base on the acute effect of PA on the underlying cognitive processes of academic performance is growing.